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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff essentially agrees with the Statement of the 
Case presented by Appellant except to clarify the following: 
The matter before the trial court involved a diverse number 
of claims between various parties. Plaintiffs, Dakal and 
Diversified, sued to quiet title primarily as to the claims of 
Defendant American Savings & Loan (hereinafter American) and 
Defendant Liston. Defendant American made claim of a security 
interest in the property as to the Plaintiffs in the action but 
further, claimed obligations under the note with respect to 
Defendants Liston and Rydalch. 
As to all of the issues except those involving Mr. Liston, 
no dispute of fact existed and the parties read a lengthy 
stipulation of facts into the record. TR4-27. Plaintiff and 
Defendant American then rested. TR27. Thereafter, Mr. Liston 
presented testimony. 
The disposition with respect to issues involving Mr. Liston 
and Mr. Rydalch were not appealed by any party and neither liston 
or Rydalch are parties to this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts correctly recites the Stipulation of 
the parties and the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as 
entered by the trial court. Plaintiff agrees that all statements 
as to actual conduct and activities by the parties or any of them 
as drawn from the Stipulation and set forth in the Statement of 
Respondent's Brief, Page 2 
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Facts are correct. 
Plaintiff further agrees that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law contain the information stated by the 
Defendants. Plaintiff does not agree that the issue of whether 
Plaintiffs had "sufficient information to necessitate a further 
inquiry"; whether said inquiry would have led to the discovery 
that the security interest was released in error; and whether 
Plaintiffs knew or should have known that something was amiss 
regarding the representation of fee simple ownership are "facts" 
of the case in the context of this matter, but are rather 
conclusive activity of the Court improperly drawn from the facts 
of the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs contend that the decision of Diversified Equities 
v. American Savings & Loan Association, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah 
Appeals 1987) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court was decided upon sound foundations and procedures for 
judicial appellate review and constitutes a correct statement of 
law given the factual stipulation in this matter. The 
standard for review of a case presented on stipulated facts is to 
treat the findings based thereon as the functional equivalent of 
conclusions of law. 
Plaintiffs further contend that they where bona fide 
purchasers for value being privy to no notice that required 
further inquiry, but even if further inquiry were required, 
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Plaintiff satisfied its duty of inquiry. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ASSESSED THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW FOR A CASE PRESENTED ON STIPULATED FACTS. 
The factual setting of this case although arduous in scope, 
did not bring with it any dispute as to what had occurred. TR4-5. 
In a lengthy recitation of events, counsel for Plaintiffs 
Diversified Equities and Dakal, Incorporated; counsel for 
Defendant American; and counsel for Defendant Rydalch read into 
the record the events and activities which led to the dispute 
between the parties. TR4-27. Thereafter, these parties rested 
and Mr. Liston, who is not a party to this appeal, presented 
brief testimony. TR27. 
The trial court issued a twelve page memorandum decision and 
directed Appellant's counsel to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law therefrom. Memorandum Decision, page 12. As 
cited by American in their brief at page 14, the trial court 
memorandum decision does indicate that the Court reviewed the 
stipulation of facts, examined the documents and considered the 
testimony of witnesses. The court, however, goes on to say: 
The court concludes that any attempt to set 
forth the facts and events leading up to and 
necessary for the disposition of the claims of 
the parties would be in most part a 
reiteration of the stipulation of facts, and 
the parties should therefore refer to such 
stipulation when necessary. In the following 
conclusions of the court reference will be 
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made, where appropriate, to the particular 
exhibits and pages of the transcript of 
stipulation relied upon by the court. 
Memorandum Decision, page 2. 
The Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate 
standard for reviewing a case decided upon stipulation of facts 
was to treat the court's findings as "tantamount to conclusions 
of law with the stipulation of facts being the functional 
equivalent of true findings of fact." Diversified Equities v. 
American Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). 
While this issue has not been previously stated in such terms by 
this Court, it finds well-reason support in the courts of sister 
states. Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792 (Ala. 1980), City of 
Spencer v. Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, 216 N.W.2d 406 
(Iowa 1974), Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. 1979), 
Fullerton Union High School Dist. v. Riles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 897 
(App. 1983)1. 
The process of trial requires both a determination of what 
actually occurred, and the interpretation of the meaning of those 
acts as filtered through the analysis of law. Thus, when the 
Trial Judge acts in the dual capacity of both trier of fact and 
arbiter of the law his ruling is divided into findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. 
1
 In fact, Appellants do not contest the legal principle 
espoused by the Court of Appeals but instead attempt to style the 
"findings" of the trial court as being founded on something more 
than a stipulation of facts. Thus the issue becomes whether the 
standard of review is based on substance or form. 
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At least part of the justification for this bifurcation 
springs from the review process that provides greater deference 
to the trial court's determination of what occurred, or fact 
finding, from its legal analysis of the consequences of those 
acts or conclusions of law. 
Without facts, there is no surface upon which to apply the 
template of the law. The facts create the picture, the law gives 
it meaning. 
For this reason, the process of review afforded to findings 
of the Trial Court will often hinge on what type of determination 
the Trial Court is making. 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses". (emphasis added.) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a); State v. Walker, 64 Utah 
Ad. Rep. 10 (Ut. 1987). Conclusions of Law on the other hand are 
not accorded deference but are simply reviewed for 
correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. CORP., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 
1985). 
American relies on the case of Dang v. Cox, 655 P.2d 658 
(1982) to support its claim that the Court of Appeals applied the 
wrong standard of review. But the Dang court recognized that 
"[when]...there is conflicting evidence, [the court] give[s] 
deference to the Trial Court as the factfinder..." Id. at 660. 
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In the instant case, there were no factual disputes. The 
parties had sorted out the activities of the various players and 
were able to recite these events for the Court in their 
stipulation. No fact either of significance or necessary to 
resolve any issue or ultimately relied upon by the Court was 
contested. The script of events was written. The consequences 
of those actions remained to be resolved. 
Once such a stipulation has occurred, those facts are deemed 
decided and the trier of fact need not arbitrate differences 
between the parties. 
The question of what deference to apply during review is 
not governed by technicality, but by substance. It is not a 
matter of whether anyone at any time in the proceedings spoke 
from the stand, but what they testified to, and what evidence the 
court received with regards to the issues under review. 
There where no factual disputes between these parties now 
before the Court, the only dispute between these parties were the 
conclusions that the Trial Court should draw from the events as 
stipulated. The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the test: 
" Where the facts are not in material dispute, 
interpretation placed thereon by Trial Court 
becomes a question of law which is not 
Conclusive on Appeal"' Diversified Equities v. 
American, supra at 1136, citing City of 
Spencer v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. 216 N.W. 
2nd 406, 408 (Iowa, 1974). 
The Court of Appeals set and applied the correct standard 
for review and the procedure and analysis should be affirmed* 
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II. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
FOR VALUE WAS A LEGAL CONCLUSION IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, 
American further supports its argument that the wrong 
standard of review was used by attempting to style the 
determination the Court makes with respect to good faith 
purchaser status as one strictly of fact. American then cites 
several cases which allegedly support the position that the 
determination of whether a party is a bona fide purchaser for 
value and whether such purchaser met requirements of inquiry 
based upon notice is a strictly factual determination. 
Such a position over extends the case law and is 
inconsistent with logic or the procedure followed by the Trial 
Court. There is no question that factual questions play a 
significant role in the determination of whether one is a good 
faith purchaser. Normally the jury will have to wade through the 
facts, and will make this determination largely on what it 
decides happened. But they must apply the facts to the 
instruction of the Court on the law to reach a final decision. 
Thus, American's cases do not relegate the determination solely 
to fact, but characterize correctly the role of the jury in 
making its factual findings by applying the law as presented by 
the Court. 
The case of Berg v. Fredericks, 591 P.2d 246 (Nev. 1979), 
Respondent's Brief, Page 8 
Diversified Equities v. American Savings 
cited by American, is a good example. The Court therein states, 
"the question whether [a party] has made due inquiry, is one of 
fact to be investigated by the jury. . ."Id. at 249. The Court 
then goes on to decide that "reliance upon a vendor or similar 
person with reason to conceal a prior grantee's interest, does 
not constitute 'adequate inquiry' for purposes of rebutting the 
presumption of notice." Id.. at 249-250. Thus, the court is 
implicitly recognizing the distinction between determination of 
what occurred factually and application of facts against 
standards of law for conduct and behavior. 
The Washington Supreme Court has clearly recognized that 
determination of good faith purchaser status are mixed questions 
requiring both determination of the facts and application of the 
law. Miebach v. Colasurdo, 685 P.2d. 1074 (Wash. 1984). 
An analysis of how fact and law intertwine and may be 
distinguished was addressed by Judge Friendly in N.L.R.B. v 
Marcus Trucking Company, 286 F. 2d 583 (2CA, 1961). First 
quoting from Professor Jaffe, Judge Friendly states: "A finding 
of fact is the assertion that a phenomena has happened or is or 
will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as 
to its legal effect.'" Id., at 590 From this Judge Friendly 
developed three major groupings of determinations. 
The first involved those cases where the definition of the 
terms are not in dispute and it is necessary only to apply the 
raw facts as they are determined to the well settled meanings. 
8 
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Id. 
The second category involve those case disputes where both 
the raw facts and the meanings of the terms to which they are to 
be applied are in question. Id. at 590-591. 
And third, are those cases where the events are not in 
issue, but only the meanings of the terms to which they will be 
applied, id. at 590-591. 
The first grouping is decided solely on fact. The third 
decided solely on law, and the second combines both law and 
fact. In the instant case all of the facts were read into the 
record by the parties and it became necessary only for the Trial 
Court to decide if these facts met the standards necessary for 
the determination that Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for 
value, or that proper inquiry had been made. 
American asserts that the Trial Court viewed his 
determination as one of fact. To support this position they 
recite five of the Courts "Findings of Facts" from the Finding of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law which they prepared following the 
Memorandum Decision of the Court. They do not mention, however, 
that each of these "Findings of Fact" are also listed as 
Conclusion of Law. (C/L 11, 6, 1, 2, and 3, respectively). 
Thus, at best, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law they 
prepared recognized this determination as a mixed determination 
of fact on law. 
But of even more significance is the language of the Court 
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itself. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Fredericks wrote: 
"In applying the foregoing legal principle 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts 
and events of this case, the Court concludes that 
neither Dakal nor Diversified was a bona fide 
purchaser of the property." [Emphasis added . . .] 
(Memorandum Decision, Page 6) 
Even the Trial Court did not view its role as a finder of 
fact. The Court accepted the facts as stipulated by the parties 
and made legal conclusions based thereon. 
At most, the court in this case was called upon to determine 
not what the action of the parties were, but how they measured up 
to the standards of law. "...what is 'reasonable' on undisputed 
facts is a question of law" (citations omitted). Fullerton v. 
Riles, supra at 906. 
The basis for review utilized by the Court of Appeals and 
its judgment thereon is correct and should be affirmed. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF DAKAL ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY FREE OF THE UNRECORDED INTEREST OF 
DEFENDANT AMERICAN. 
On January 21, 1983, at the time of the closing of the sale 
of the property from Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, the chain of 
title showed that Defendant American had recorded a trust deed on 
February 2, 1978, but recorded a reconveyance of the trust deed 
1
 The Court of Appeals for Washington stated the principle as 
follows: "How the Trial Court labels the findings or conclusion 
is not determinative; this Court will treat it for what it really 
is." Stastny v. Board of Trustees or Central Washington 
University, 647 P.2d 496, 502 (1982). 
10 
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on December 7, 1982. TR14. Their deed of trust was therefore 
not properly recorded (if it even existed following the 
reconveyance and prior to the revival of the lien by the judgment 
of the Court below on July 23, 1984 ) 3 and consequently could not 
operate as notice to third persons having no actual notice of the 
interest: 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing...whereby any real 
estate may be affected, to operate as notice 
to third persons shall be proved or 
acknowledged...and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such real 
estate is situated, but shall be valid and 
binding between the parties thereto without 
such...record, and as to all other persons who 
have had actual notice. Section 57-1-6 
(U.C.A. 1953 as amended). Emphasis supplied. 
Cf. Sections 38-1-9 and 17-21-11 (U.C.A. 1953 
as amended). 
In addition, Plaintiff Dakal recorded its warranty deed on 
January 21, 1983 but the affidavit filed by Defendant American 
stating that the reconveyance was in error was not recorded until 
February 17, 1983. TR14, 16. Again, the general rule is that 
Plaintiff Dakal takes title free of this later-recorded interest: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter 
made, which shall not be recorded as provided 
in this title, shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for 
Defendants cite several cases supporting the principle that 
a mortgage released by error may be restored by a court in 
equity. Plaintiffs do not argue with the power of a court in 
equity to restore such a lien, but point out that this normally 
applies to a situation where the obligor is still in title and 
third parties have not changed their positions to their detriment 
in reliance on the error. 
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valuable consideration of the same real 
estate, or any portion thereof, where his own 
conveyance shall be first recorded. Section 
57-3-3 (U.C.A. 1953 as amended). Emphasis 
supplied. 
Clearly, Plaintiff Dakal took title on the 21st of January, 
1983 under either of these statutes free and clear of the 
unrecorded interest of Defendant American unless it can be shown 
that Plaintiff Dakal did not purchase the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration, and unless it had actual notice 
of the interest of Defendant American. 
It is important to note at the outset that a plaintiff in an 
action to quiet title has the initial burden of going forward to 
prove prima facie that he has title, but that once this prima 
facie title has been shown the burden shifts to the defendant to 
overcome the title shown in the plaintiff. Ash v. State, 572 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977). Certainly, the state of the record 
establishes that Plaintiff Dakal has established a prima facie 
title in that the recording of Plaintiff's warranty deed pre-
dates that of the affidavit filed by Defendant American. 
In Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court was faced with facts similar to the case at bar in 
that the plaintiffs failed to record a quitclaim deed prior to 
the time that Murray First Thrift recorded a trust deed securing 
an obligation of the sellers of the property to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs alleged that Murray First Thrift had "actual" 
notice of their interest, and the Court held, "Whether Murray 
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First had actual notice was a question of fact which the 
plaintiffs had the burden of proving-" 666 P.2d at 310. Accord 
Beloate v. Smith, 218 S.W. 2d 361 (Ark. 1949). Thus, the burden 
of proof is upon American to refute Plaintiff's title. 
A. PLAINTIFF TOOK LEGAL TITLE TO THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY WITHOUT ACTUAL NOTICE OF ANY CLAIM 
BY DEFENDANT AMERICAN. 
The question of whether a purchaser takes title to realty 
free of an unrecorded interest under Section 57-1-6 (U.C.A. 1953 
as amended) by reason of not having "actual notice" of the 
interest, or under Section 57-3-3 (U.C.A. 1953 as amended) by 
reason of having purchased the property in good faith for a 
valuable consideration, are indistinguishable from a practical 
standpoint. "Actual notice" of an interest in realty as used in 
Section 57-1-6 (U.C.A. 1953 as amended) is found if, "...a party 
dealing with the land had information or facts which would put a 
prudent man upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would lead to 
actual knowledge as to the state of the title." Johnson v. Bell, 
supra, 666 P.2d at 310. The overlap between the definition of 
actual notice set forth above and good faith is considerable: 
Good faith ordinarily exists where the 
purchase is made with an honest purpose; good 
faith is absent where ignorance of outstanding 
interests is deliberate and intentional, and 
it has been held that a want of caution and 
diligence which an honest man of ordinary 
prudence is accustomed to exercise in making 
purchases is, in contemplation of law, a want 
of good faith. 77 Am.Jur 2d Vendor & 
Purchaser, Sec. 646, p. 761. 
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Defendants claim that Plaintiffs had notice of the 
obligation to American and were not good faith purchasers. This 
claim seems to center on the mention of American in the Rydalch 
title insurance policy and/or the willingness of Rydalch to sell 
the property for one half its value. (Defendant's Brief, page 
22). Defendants rely on several cases to support this position. 
There are many Utah Supreme Court cases that discuss the 
circumstances under which a purchaser takes title subject to an 
unrecorded interest in realty. While none appear with quite the 
same facts as the instant case an analysis of these cases helps 
to focus the facts in the case at bar, and to distinguish the 
reliance of defendants on several such cases. 
The fundamental principle is that if a purchaser has actual 
knowledge of the claim or interest of another in property but 
purchases the same in spite of that knowledge, as where the 
vendor tells the purchaser of the interest of a third party, the 
purchaser takes subject to the interest of the third party. 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 177 P.2d 763 (Utah 1918). This extreme, 
of course, is clear. 
1. Inadequacy of Consideration 
The sale price of the property as compared to market value 
is often an important consideration in determining whether a 
purchase was without notice. It is the primary claim of 
Defendants in this matter. Defendants rely upon three Utah cases 
and several cases from other states supporting the principle that 
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a purchase for nominal consideration or at grossly inadequate 
prices will create notice. The sale price in the case at bar was 
approximately one half of the market price. 
The facts of the cases in which the inadequacy of 
consideration are found to provide notice of an unrecorded 
interest are, however, at great variance from those in the case 
at bar. For example, in Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 212 P. 526 (Utah 
1923) relied upon by Defendant, the Court restates the general 
rule as found in 89 Cyc. 1718: 
Where the contract under which the purchaser 
buys is sufficient on its face to put him upon 
inquiry as to what the consideration was, or 
where it plainly shows that the consideration 
has not been paid or performed, he is 
chargeable with notice thereof. A nominal or 
grossly inadequate consideration recited in a 
deed is a sufficient circumstance, for a 
reasonable time after such deed is made and 
recorded, to put a purchase on inquiry.... 
212 P. at 530. 
The deed in Lawley stated that the consideration paid for 
property value at $7,500.00 was but $10.00, and the revenue 
stamps placed upon the deed indicated that less than $500.00 was 
actually paid for the property. Other cases cited approvingly in 
Lawley regarding notice of an adverse claim to title arising from 
the inadequacy of consideration contained facts showing the 
purchase of property worth between $2,200.00 - $6,000.00 for 
$5.00 and purchase of property worth $30,000.00 for $100.00. Id. 
at 531. Thus, Lawley is dissimilar from the case at bar. 
Defendants next rely on the case of Meyer v. General 
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American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Ut. 1977). Meyer does not deal 
with a situation involving the purchase of real property, but 
rather a claim of fraudulent conveyance. The graveman of the 
claim however hung on the "fair consideration" requirements of 
Utah Code Annotated, §25-1-4. In Meyer a caterpillar was 
purchased for $2,500.00. It was worth $20,000 - $25,000 or ten 
time what was being paid for it. Further, in Meyer the purchaser 
knew the property to be readily sellable, he had a ready buyer 
for $20,000. Id. at 1097. 
The final case relied on by Defendants is Pender v. Bird, 
224 P.2d 1057 (Utah 1950). In this matter the Court relied both 
on the inadequacy of $25.00 consideration for a Quit Claim Deed 
and the statements of the vendor regarding his lack of title in 
determining that the purchase took title subject to the interest 
of a third party. While the market value of the property is not 
stated in the opinion the price of $25.00 for real property seems 
clearly inadequate. Add to this the fact the buyer took only by 
quit claim and was advised by his seller of a lack of title and 
notice seems clear. 
A great divergence in value and consideration seems to flow 
through the case law where value versus consideration serves as a 
basis for notice. 
The market value of the property purchased in Corey v. 
Roberts, 25 P.2d 940 (Utah 1933) was not stated in the opinion, 
but the general magnitude of the value of the property can be 
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estimated from the recitation of facts indicating that the 
property was collateral on obligations totaling a little over 
$45,000.00. The Court stated that language in a deed of 
conveyance from the vendor's predecessor to the vendor indicating 
that but $10.00 was paid for the property acted as notice to the 
purchacc*r of the interest of the vendor's predecessor. 
Cases decided in other jurisdictions shed further light on 
the ratio of consideration to value necessary to impart notice of 
an interest. The sale price of $691.43 was deemed so inadequate 
as to defeat a purchaser's claim of good faith where the value of 
the property was between $12,500.00 and $14,000.00 in Phillips v. 
Latham, 523 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). In Morris v. Wicks, 
106 P. 1048 (Kansas 1910), the amount of $1.00 was considered 
inadequate and thereof the purchaser took title with notice of a 
prior claim. Rogers v. Barton, 53 N.E.2d 862 (111. 1944) found 
the purchase of $80,000.00 of realty for $4,100.00 inadequate 
consideration and sufficient notice of the interest of another. 
Plaintiff Dakal is aware of only two reported decisions 
addressing the adequacy of consideration where the price paid is 
approximately one half of fair market value, as in the case at 
bar. Payment of $1,000.00 for land valued at between $2,000.00 
and $3,000.00 was determined sufficient consideration so as not 
to give rise to notice of an adverse claim in Noe v. Smith, 169 
P. 1108 (Ok. 1917). In Owen v. Owen, 336 So.2d 782 (La. 1976), 
payment of 44% of the market value of realty was deemed 
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sufficient and held not to have provided notice of the interest 
of another. 
In the case before the Court, Plaintiff Dakal purchased for 
approximately one half the market value of the subject realty. 
TR12, 15. At the time the parties were negotiating the sale 
price, the property was encumbered by a lis pendens filed by 
Liston, a trust deed noticed for foreclosure by Holzer in January 
of 1983, and Rydalch was unable to obtain new financing upon the 
duplex with which to pay Holzer due to his absentee Landlord 
status and the problem with Holzer. TR17, 19. Rydalch had been 
attempting unsuccessfully to sell the property since Roy Miller 
disappeared without paying the obligation to Holzer, which 
obligation came due within thirty days of the time Rydalch 
purchased the property in May of 1982, TRIO. It therefore 
appears that no buyer for the duplex had been obtained as the 
result of efforts from sometime in July of 1982 until January of 
1983. TR11-15. Not only was Holzer attempting to foreclose on 
his trust deed, but Mr. Rydalch and his family were threatened 
with physical violence as well. TR15, 18. 
In short, there were very obvious reasons to explain why 
Rydalch was willing to let the property go for one half of the 
market value. He was about to lose the property through the sale 
by Holzer, and perhaps the health of his family and himself as 
well. The property was also encumbered by the lis pendens filed 
on behalf of Liston. Although he had tried to obtain a buyer 
Respondent's Brief, Page 19 
Diversified Equities v. American Savings 
throughout the six months preceding the sale to Plaintiff Dakal, 
he was unable to do so in spite of his urgent need to make a 
sale. Under the totality of the circumstances, the purchase 
price was clearly not so inadequate as to give rise to "actual 
notice" of the interest of another in the property. 
2. Other Factors Affecting Notice. 
As Defendants point out, there may be other information 
which puts a buyer on notice. This usually consists of factors 
that point to some party as either being the actual owner of the 
property or holding an interest in the property. 
In Corey v. Roberts, supra, Corey owned certain commercial 
realty which was mortgaged to a bank. As the Coreys fell behind 
on their payments, the bank sought additional security for the 
obligation by having the Coreys quit claim the property to a bank 
officer, Mr. Wattis, who was the nephew of Mr. Corey, in order to 
facilitate the management of the property. Roberts purchased the 
property, known as the "Corey Block" or the "Corey Property", 
from Wattis. Prior to the time of his purchase, Roberts had 
examined statements of the bank, the condition of the title, and 
knew both of the recited consideration of $10.00 for the 
conveyance from Corey to Wattis and the true value of the 
property. Mr. Roberts apparently insisted that Wattis provide a 
warrant deed as well. Under these facts, Roberts was deemed to 
have taken title to the property with constructive notice of the 
interest of Corey. From the facts of the opinions, it is clear 
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that the purchaser had sufficient information for him to identify 
both the possibility of a claim to the property and the source 
from whom information concerning this claim could be obtained. 
Similarly, in Morris v. Blunt, 99 P.686 (Utah 1909) the 
Court found that the facts known to the purchaser were sufficient 
to give notice of the unrecorded interest of another. A Mrs. 
Kersey owned certain property which she put up for sale prior to 
leaving Utah for an extended period. At the suggestion of the 
agent she had selected to handle the sale, she left an executed 
deed naming as grantee one Graffam, with whom negotiations were 
underway. The sale fell through after Graffam had obtained 
possession of the deed, and he in turn deeded the realty to 
Blunt. The Court found that Blunt took the property subject to 
the interest of Mrs. Kersey: 
We are further of the opinion that the 
respondent was not an innocent purchaser for 
value. She lived within a quarter of a mile 
of the [Kersey] property. At the time she 
claims to have purchased it she knew that 
neither Graffam nor the [agent] had possession 
of the property or exercised any kind of 
ownership over it, and that the appellants, or 
some of them, were in the possession of the 
property and were and had been exercising acts 
of ownership over it. When she obtained her 
deed, she made no attempt to obtain possession 
until a considerable time thereafter. The 
only consideration paid by her was the giving 
of a mortgage on the property. 99 P. at 689. 
Again, the facts established both that the purchaser had 
knowledge of information sufficient to provide her notice of a 
claim by a third person and to point out to her from whom an 
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inquiry could have been made, 
But not all facts require inquiry. In Stanley v. Schwalby, 
162 U.S. 255, 40 L.Ed. 960 (1896), the purchaser learned through 
his agent that a parcel he desired to purchase was possibly owned 
at one point by a Mr. McMillan, but no deed could be found in the 
chain of title and the agent concluded that the price must not 
have been paid. He thereupon advised his principal to proceed 
with the purchase, and an action was filed by one claiming title 
through McMillan. In quieting title in the purchaser, the 
Supreme Court held: 
[But] in order to charge a purchaser with 
notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance, 
he...must either have knowledge of the 
conveyance, or, at least of such circumstances 
as would, by the exercise of ordinary 
diligence and judgment, lead to that 
knowledge; and vague rumor or suspicion is not 
a sufficient foundation upon which to charge a 
purchaser with knowledge of a title in a third 
person. [citation omitted]. 162 U.S. at 276, 
40 L. Ed. at 967. 
The condition of the chain of title also may give rise to 
actual notice of the interest of another. Thus, in Hayes v. 
Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781 (Ut 1946), the Court held that the purchaser 
of property took title to the realty subject to certain 
restrictive covenants which were not reflected in the deed 
received by the vendor but which were found in a prior deed. 
Reasoning that a purchaser is charged with notice of both the 
contents in his chain of title and anything in the chain which 
gave rise to a duty of inquiry, the Court held, "The restrictions 
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appear in defendant's chain of title - therefore he is chargeable 
with knowledge of the purpose for which the restrictions were 
made." 169 P.2d at 784. This case is distinguishable from the 
case at bar in that the chain of title in Hayes contained no 
indication that the restriction had been removed, but only showed 
that a later deed did not contain, without explanation, a 
restrictive covenant found in an earlier deed. 
Similarly, the buyer of real property was charged with 
having notice of a right of way in Salt Lake, Garfield & Western 
Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 291 P.2d 883 (Ut 1955). The 
plaintiff's predecessor was awarded a right of way in 1897 by a 
decree of the Third District Court. Two deeds to the property 
affected by the decree were prepared in 1909, with each reserving 
the right of way taken through condemnation. One of the deeds 
recited conveyed the vendor's interest, "...less that portion of 
land awarded to the Saltair Beach Railroad...by decree of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah...". The second deed 
merely reserved, "...the portion of said land awarded to the 
Saltair Beach Railroad Company for right of way...'". Id. 
This case is of significance to the instant matter. The Court 
ruled that buyer took title subject to the right of way, but it's 
comments concerning the second deed show that more than a passing 
reference to the interest of another is required to give rise to 
a duty of inquiry: 
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It must be conceded that were the reservation 
contained in the second deed mentioned 
reciting only that the land reserved was 
awarded there would be made a much stronger 
argument. Without the recital of a decree or 
the court were made, the duty to inquire would 
be much less. But here we have a deed in 
defendants' chain of title which reserves the 
land awarded to the Saltair Beach Railroad Co. 
for the right of way, by decree of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Here the specific office in a definite 
building is pointed out where the reservation 
for right of way can be found. The grantee is 
pointed out. 291 P.2d at 884-5. (Emphasis in 
original). 
It seems that the Court would have found that the purchaser took 
free of the right of way had the deed not included specific 
language, even though the deed recited the reservation of the 
right of way and even if the Saltair Beach Railroad Co. was named 
grantee of the right of way. The Court in essence indicates that 
more than a vague reference to a possible interest is necessary 
to impart notice of a claim, but rather that a certain threshold 
must be met. The identity of the source from whom reasonable 
inquiry could be made must be clear. 
This interpretation of Salt Lake, Garfield, & Western 
Railway Co. is supported by Peterson v. Carter, 359 P.2d 1055 (Ut 
1961). In this case, plaintiffs, who owned lots and operated a 
real estate business, and defendants, who were contractors, 
executed a contract by which plaintiffs agreed to deed their lots 
to defendants in order that the latter could construct houses 
upon them. The contract specified that a note in the amount of 
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$850 would be executed by the defendants for each lot 
transferred, that the notes were due and payable upon the sale of 
each lot and constructed building, and that all sales would be 
handled through plaintiffs' realty company. This contract was 
recorded. The lots were sold, the plaintiffs were not paid, and 
the plaintiffs then brought suit against the purchasers on the 
theory that they had a vendor's lien upon the property. The 
Court found for the purchasers: 
We believe that if any notice were given, it 
was to the effect that would lead a reasonable 
person to believe and assume that all sums due 
under the contract had been paid and that all 
the covenants inuring to the benefit of the 
plaintiff's had been performed, and that if 
not, it was plaintiffs' own failure to protect 
themselves, and that they had waived any claim 
to any real or illusory vendor's lien. 359 
P-2d at 1057, 
Thus, even where the facts disclose that the purchaser has 
notice in the chain of title of the possibility of an unsatisfied 
claim against property, and in the absence of a recorded document 
releasing that claim, there is no duty of inquiry imposed upon 
the purchaser. In reasoning that the recorded contract gives no 
notice of a claim, the opinion relies heavily on the plaintiffs' 
ability to protect itself since the plaintiffs by the terms of 
the contract would be present at all closings. Thus, we see the 
Court noting and considering the fault of the party seeking to 
defeat the title of the purchaser in determining whether the 
purchaser takes free of an unrecorded interest. And, as in Salt 
Lake, Garfield & Western Railway v. Allied Materials Co., supra. 
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a mere possibility of a claim is not sufficient to cross the 
threshold necessary to impart actual notice. 
In the case at bar, of course, the record of title was clear 
on the date Plaintiff Dakal purchased the property from Rydalch. 
A title search disclosed a trust deed executed and recorded in 
1978, and a reconveyance of that deed in December of 1982. 
Clearly, the chain of title gave no hint of a problem and gave 
rise to no duty of inquiry. Neither do other facts shown to have 
been within the possession of Plaintiff Dakal provide more, at 
best, than a remote suggestion of a claim by an unidentifiable 
potential lienholder. 
As noted in Peterson v. Carter, supra, whether the claiming 
party is without fault is a factor. Perhaps the earliest Utah 
decision discussing the circumstances under which a purchaser 
took free of an unrecorded interest is that of Townsend v. 
Hooper, 2 Utah 548 (1880). James Townsend, the record owner of a 
hotel, had an agreement with one of his polygamous wives 
according to which she was his equal partner in the property in 
exchange for her services assisting him running the business. 
This agreement was kept secret, for reasons one might speculate 
related to family harmony. James had, however, secured several 
debts with the property and defaulted on the notes, following 
which a foreclosure sale was had and the defendant purchased the 
property. 
The plaintiff filed an action to recover her half interest 
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in the property, alleging that her course of conduct was 
sufficient notice of her interest in the property. The plaintiff 
testified that she worked at the hotel, although both before and 
after she entered into the agreement with her husband, and that 
she was the wife of James, and that these facts were sufficient 
to place the public on notice that she held an interest. The 
Court rejected this argument, holding: "The rights of the 
[purchaser] could not be affected by the agreement; they stood as 
purchasers for value, and acted in good faith, and the fault was 
that of the appellant in concealing the agreement." 2 Utah at 
556. Thus, the Court established early on that the fault of the 
person whose interest is unrecorded is one of the factors to be 
considered in determining whether the purchaser takes free of the 
unrecorded interest. 
In evaluating the impact of Townsend upon the case at bar, 
it is important to note that Defendant American told three 
different persons in the course of four separate phone calls that 
the obligation secured by the trust deed was satisfied, 
transmitted the deed of reconveyance to an attorney, and recorded 
the reconveyance. 
While the cases cited involve a wide range of fact patterns, 
in each case where actual notice of an interest of another was 
found the purchaser had knowledge of significant information both 
sufficient to apprise him of an interest in another and to 
identify a source from whom reliable information could be 
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obtained concerning the potential interest. In Lawley v. 
Hickenlooper, supra, the deed contained both notice of the 
inadequacy of consideration and the name of the grantor who 
conveyed for that minimal consideration. This is true as well of 
all the cases wherein the notice of an adverse interest was 
contained in the chain of title, in that the chain disclosed both 
the potential adverse claim and the identity of a reliable person 
from whom answers concerning the interest could be obtained. See 
Hayes v. Gibbs, supra, and Salt Lake, Garfield, & Western Railway 
Co., supra. In Pender v. Bird, the vendor told the purchaser of a 
quitclaim deed that he had no title, and an abstract would 
contain the identity of the record title holder to whom an 
inquiry could be made. Where notice of the interest arises from 
possession of the premises by one other than the vendor, as in 
Morris v. Blunt, supra, possession gives notice of the claim and 
the possessor is the logical individual from whom an explanation 
of the possessor interest could be obtained. In contrast, 
Stanley v. Schwalby, supra, and Peterson v. Carter, supra, 
contained insufficient information to satisfy both requirements 
and the purchasers therefore took without notice of the third 
party unrecorded interests. 
In the case at bar, the evidence presented to the trial 
court through the stipulated facts of the litigants was 
insufficient to meet the threshold requirement set forth in the 
case law mandating that a purchaser have knowledge both of a 
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possible claim and the identity of one from whom inquiry could be 
made. Even if the Court adopts the conclusion of the trial court 
that the sale price of the property should have flagged the 
unrecorded interest of another, there was no indication from that 
fact as to who should be contacted to inquire as to any hidden 
interest. While the trial court concluded that Mr. Pentelute 
knew of the interest of Defendant American at the time of the 
sale to Rydalch, the same could be said as to the unnamed (but 
presumably known) earlier real estate broker and Beehive Thrift. 
In addition, at the time of the sale, Mr. Pentelute was aware 
that Mr. Holzer and Mr. Liston also claimed an interest in the 
property. 
In conclusion, the evidence before the trial court does not 
support its conclusion of law that Plaintiff Dakal had actual 
notice of an unrecorded interest in the property. 
B. PLAINTIFF DAKAL SATISFIED IT'S DUTY 
OF INQUIRY IF SUCH DUTY EXISTED. 
Although Plaintiff Dakal maintains that facts known to it 
did not create a duty of inquiry, Plaintiff Dakal clearly acted 
reasonably and fulfilled any duty to inquire which may have 
resulted from those facts by contacting Defendant American and 
obtaining its assurances that the obligation secured by the trust 
deed had been satisfied, as evidenced by the reconveyance of the 
trust deed filed and recorded. 
The Utah case of O'Reilly v. McLean, 37 P.2d 770 (Utah 1934) 
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is factually similar to the facts in the case at bar and, as 
Plaintiff Dakal did exactly what the O'Reilly Court mandated by 
way of investigation, Plaintiff has without question satisfied 
its duty of inquiry. 
The facts of O'Reilly disclose that Edna McLean gave a 
mortgage on her property to Eliza O'Reilly in 1925. In June of 
1929, the obligation apparently being in default, O'Reilly sought 
to foreclose against McLean and a second lienholder, Utah Lumber 
Company, and a decree of foreclosure was entered against both. 
No sale was held, however, and on March 29, 1930 an affidavit was 
filed setting forth that a man named John Gardner had an interest 
in the property. The foreclosure was set aside on April 19, 
1930. Gardner then filed an answer claiming that the property 
had been sold at a sheriff's sale on or about July 16, 1929 to 
Utah Lumber, who in turn conveyed to O'Reilly, who conveyed to 
Gardner on September 30, 1929. On August 15, 1930, Utah Mortgage 
Co. intervened in the action, alleging that Gardner had agreed to 
convey the realty to it on March 4, 1930. A guardian ad litem 
appointed for O'Reilly answered the complaint of both Gardner and 
Utah Mortgage in intervention by alleging that Gardner had 
procured his deed by fraud when O'Reilly was 85 years old and 
feeble, and seeking that title revert to her. 
The Court summarized the testimony of Utah Mortgage on the 
condition of the record as follows: 
...it appeared that on June 7, 1926, an action 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien was filed by 
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the Utah Lumber Company... A judgment of 
foreclosure was entered and said property sold 
by the sheriff..., and a Sheriff's deed 
thereto was issued to Utah Lumber Company. 
That on September 29, 1929, the Utah Lumber 
Company conveyed said property to Eliza 
O'Reilly. That the abstract further showed 
the commencement of plaintiff's foreclosure 
action on June 12, 1929. That the abstract 
did not disclose any other proceedings under 
said decree of foreclosure. That it appeared 
from the abstract that Eliza O'Reilly had 
conveyed said property by warranty deed to 
John Gardner, under date of March 13, 1930, 
and that on April 22, 1930, said Gardner had a 
good, clear, and unemcumbered title to said 
property. 37 P.2d at 771. 
Utah Mortgage explained that it had relied on the state of the 
abstract of title in purchasing the property without notice of 
any claim, believing that the equitable interest of O'Reilly 
shown in the abstract merged with the legal title conveyed to her 
and recorded on September 29, 1929. The trial court gave 
judgment for the amount of the mortgage to O'Reilly against 
McLean, but found that Utah Mortgage took title free and clear of 
any interest of O'Reilly or Gardner. 
Initially, the Court addressed the issue of whether the 
legal and equitable interests merged when O'Reilly purchased the 
property. The Court cited to several treatises regarding 
mortgages and stated the general rule that the intention of the 
person holding the equitable interest as to whether she wishes a 
merger with the legal interest acquired determines whether the 
equitable interest is merged with the legal title. The Court 
concluded from the record that O'Reilly did not intend to merge 
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her two interests, and that when she conveyed by warranty deed to 
Gardner, she intended to and did retain her original mortgage 
interest. 
The Court declined to determine, however, whether Utah 
Mortgage could rely on the abstract without inquiring of O'Reilly 
as to her intentions of merger. Instead, the Court found that 
Utah Mortgage had received an indication prior to the sale to 
Utah Mortgage from Gardner that his predecessor, O'Reilly, wished 
to assert her mortgage interest and that this gave rise to a duty 
of inquiry. However, prior to the time of the conveyance from 
Gardner to Utah Mortgage, Gardner informed the latter that he had 
satisfied the mortgage to O'Reilly. Utah Mortgage never 
contacted O'Reilly to verify this information. 
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision below, clearly 
set forth the duty of inquiry required of Utah Mortgage: 
Having sufficient information to put it upon 
inquiry, it was intervener's duty to make such 
investigation and it is charged with the 
knowledge which it would have thus obtained... 
[Utah Mortgage] could not rely on Gardner's 
statement that he had paid the mortgage and 
let the matter rest there. Devlin on Real 
Estate, vol. 2, sec. 742, uses the following 
language: 
Where the grantor says that his title 
has been defective or has been 
encumbered, the purchaser has received 
sufficient information to put him upon 
inquiry, and the fact that the grantor 
adds that his title has been made 
perfect, or the encumbrance has been 
removed, will not relieve the purchaser 
from making inquiry, and determining 
this fact for himself. 
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If a purchaser is informed by his 
grantor that there is a mortgage upon 
the property, but that the mortgage has 
been satisfied, and he acts upon this 
statement without making further 
inquiry, he does so at his own peril. 
Before taking his deed, he should have 
endeavored to ascertain the truth of the 
statement from mortgagor. 
Plaintiff Dakal followed the instructions of this Court precisely 
and inquired directly of Defendant American, the claimant, as 
well as several others holding potential interests in realty, 
regarding the status of the mortgage. Plaintiff Dakal was told 
by Defendant American without equivocation that the mortgage had 
been released. TR 18. This information was of course 
corroborated as well by phone calls described to Plaintiff 
Dakal's agent by both Rydalch and his attorney, and the record of 
title showing a recorded reconveyance of the trust deed. While 
Plaintiff Dakal would not be permitted to rely on the statements 
of his vendor, Plaintiff did not, but instead conferred directly 
with the mortgagee. 
A number of other Utah Supreme Court decisions agree that an 
inquiry is sufficient if directed towards the entity having the 
potential interest. The general rule stating the duty of inquiry 
is found in Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (Utah 1954): 
[T]he inquiry must be made at a reliable 
source from which the true state of facts will 
be naturally disclosed; it is not sufficient 
that the purchaser make an inquiry of a person 
when he knows that it is to such person's 
interest to misrepresent or conceal the 
existence of the outstanding interest, and 
that such person does deny its existence. 265 
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P.2d at 649, quoting 55 Am.Jur Sec. 703, page 
1081. 
O'Reilly is consistent with this principle in that Mrs. 
O'Reilly was the logical person to consult concerning her 
intention as to whether she intended a merger of the legal and 
equitable interests. 
Another example of the application of this principle is 
found in Webster v. Knop, 312 P.2d 557 (Utah 1957). Knop entered 
into a written grubstake agreement with two brothers, Lloyd and 
Carl Webster. In essence, Knop was the financier for the 
prospecting and the Webster brothers went into the field to 
perform the work. Although the agreement expired on July 31, 
1954, the brothers located and filed a claim in the names of all 
three men on August 12, 1954. At the time of their filing, 
however, there was an existing oil and gas lease on the same 
parcel which had the effect of voiding their claim. Knob re-
filed the claim in his name alone on August 27, 1954, Congress 
having passed on August 13, 1954 an act permitting mineral claims 
to be filed over certain existing oil and gas leases. Knop 
conveyed his interest in the claim the following year to Douglas; 
Davis and Grant Shumway, who defended the action to quiet title 
brought by the Websters by alleging he purchases without notice 
of the claim of the Websters as a bona fide purchaser. 
The opinion first discusses the circumstances surrounding 
the erroneous filing in the names of the three men and the 
subsequent filing in the name of Knop, and concluded that a 
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constructive trust arose in favor of the Websters. The 
defendants argued that they took title to the claim free of this 
trust, as it did not appear on the record, but the Court refused 
to so hold: 
When the defendants Davis and Shumway entered 
into agreements for the purchase of the 
[claims], they knew of the prior location and 
the parties named as colocators. This alone 
should have put them on notice that an inquiry 
should be made of the original colocators. 
312 P.2d at 560. 
The plain meaning of this language is that the Court would 
have permitted Davis and Shumway to take title free of the trust 
had they consulted with the Webster brothers prior to their 
acquisition of the claim. 
Still another case supporting Plaintiff Dakal's argument 
that it made a reasonable and prudent inquiry as to the status of 
Defendant American's interest is Meagher v. Dean/ 91 P.2d 454 
(Utah 1939). Lucinda Dean was the owner in fee of realty in 
October of 1929. She exchanged her property for that of Thomas 
Davis on the 31st of October, but Davis did not record the 
warranty deed delivered to him. On November 1, Davis mortgaged 
the property to Meagher and delivered to him both the warranty 
deed from Dean and the mortgage deed. Neither instrument was 
recorded. 
Dean believed that Davis had defrauded her, and she 
unsuccessfully tried to contact him. Being unable to do so, she 
determined to transfer the property deeded by her to Davis to 
Respondent's Brief, Page 35 
Diversified Equities v. American Savings 
another. She believed that she could extinguish the rights of 
Davis by transferring the property to another prior to his 
recordation of her deed to him. She therefore sold and deeded 
the same property previously conveyed to her grandson, who 
recorded his deed prior to the recordation of the Dean to Davis 
deed. 
In the meantime, a third party named BCN Baxendale had 
attempted to purchase the property from Davis, had defaulted on 
his payments, but remained in possession as tenants. Finally, 
Davis quitclaimed their interest in the property in 1934 to 
Meagher in exchange for the cancellation of their debt. 
Meagher brought his quiet title action to clear the cloud 
created by the recorded deed of Dean's grandson, and he defended 
through an affirmative defense seeking to quiet his title. 
The Court upheld the judgment of the trial court in favor of 
Meagher, the plaintiff, remarking that the possession of the 
realty by Baxendale was open and gave notice of a possible claim 
to the property by a third person, but that the grandson had not 
inquired as to the potential interest of one in possession. 
A person about to purchase land in the 
possession of a third person, who inquires of 
the person in possession as to his rights, 
learning that he holds as lessee of another, 
cannot safely stop his inquiry at that point, 
but should then inquire of the landlord. 91 
P.2d at 457. See also, Deetjen v. Richter, 6 
P. 595. 
In the instant matter no additional information helpful to 
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American could be gleened from questioning those in possession of 
the property. This approach revealed only the claim of Liston 
which was released through the actions of Holzer so as to allow 
the closing. If Plaintiff Dakal was required to inquire 
further, it did in fact conduct further inquiry based upon those 
identified by Rydalch as having a possible interest in the 
realty. Plaintiff Dakal directly questioned Defendant American 
concerning the status of their trust deed and was informed that 
the deed had in fact been reconveyed. 
The final Utah Supreme Court case worthy of mention on the 
issue of the extent of inquiry required is Salt Lake, Garfield & 
Western Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., supra. In addition 
to the reference in the chain of title to a right of way 
discussed above, the Court also indicated that the poles, guy 
wires, and trolley wires on the property purchased by the 
defendant sufficed to establish such possession as would give 
rise to a duty to inquire. The Court's criticism of the 
purchaser's lack of inquiry makes clear from whom the Court 
believed the defendant should have sought information: 
"Defendants made no inquiry of plaintiff although the plaintiff's 
railroad ran adjacent to defendants' land and notwithstanding 
plaintiff's poles, guy wires and trolley wires were within the 
description of defendants' land." 291 P.2d at 886. 
The above-cited line of Utah cases is in accord with the 
generally stated rule as found in Thomson on Real Property: 
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If a purchaser, put upon inquiry as to some 
claim or title affecting the validity of the 
title to the land he is about to purchase, 
makes proper inquiry in regard to the matter 
of the person having or claiming an adverse 
interest in the property, and they conceal or 
withhold the information sought, such persons 
cannot afterward charge him with notice of the 
right or claim not disclosed. 
The person put upon inquiry is in the first 
instance only bound to apply to the party in 
interest for information/ and is not obliged 
to press his inquiries further unless the 
answer he receives corroborates the prior 
statement, or reveals the existence of other 
sources of information. When he has followed 
the best sources of information to ascertain 
the truth of the rumors or statements which 
have put him upon inquiry, and has been 
misled, he ought not to be chargeable with 
notice of statements which he has endeavored 
in vain to verify, especially in favor of the 
party misleading him. The equitable doctrine 
of constructive notice cannot be invoked to 
relieve a party from responsibility for his 
own misstatements. (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Pentelute, whom the Court found was the agent of 
Plaintiff Dakal, conducted the investigation required by Utah 
case law and suggested in the general rule stated above. He 
first inquired of the vendor, Mr. Rydalch, as to outstanding 
liens on the property and was told of the claims of Holzer and 
Liston. He inquired as to the interest of Beehive and Defendant 
American and was told that obligations to these lenders had been 
satisfied. He obtained verbal confirmation from Rydalch's 
attorney, as well as a copy of the reconveyance from Defendant 
American. Had he stopped his inquiry at that point, it might 
have been insufficient and Plaintiff Dakal might have taken title 
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subject to the interest of Defendant American. But Mr. Pentelute 
did not rely on the statements of his vendor, his vendor's 
attorney, the reconveyance of the trust deed delivered to him, or 
the abstract of title. Rather Plaintiff Dakal, through its 
agent, inquired directly of Defendant American as to the status 
of the obligation and was informed that the obligation had been 
satisfied. TR18. While this was determined to be in error weeks 
later, Plaintiff Dakal was not responsible for the negligence of 
Defendant American and its apparently shoddy accounting system. 
The very real question emerges in this matter, where can a 
reasonable inquiry be made if not from the entity having an 
interest in the property? The obvious answer is that no more 
reliable source exists than was consulted in the case at bar by 
Plaintiff Dakal. 
As stated by the Court of Appeals: 
"...we cannot agree with the lower court's 
conclusion of law that Pentelute and Peck (as 
opposed to Rydalch, who clearly knew better) 
had sufficient information to necessitate 
further inquiry into the status of American's 
Trust Deed. 
While the circumstances were suspicious and 
called for inquiry, Pentelute, acting for 
Peck, inquired -- and with sufficient 
diligence to meet the duty imposed by the 
doctrine of inquiry notice. He had a title 
search performed and he personally contacted 
American even though the results of Rydalch's 
and Burnett's three prior contacts were 
accurately -- if disingenuously 
communicated to him and even rnough he had a 
copy of the reconveyance." 739 P.2d at 1136-
1137. (Emphasis in original). 
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Plaintiff Dakal therefore prays that this Court affirms the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals that Plaintiff Dakal take title 
free and clear of the unrecorded interest of Defendant American. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiff Dakal fulfilled its duty of 
inquiry, if in fact any duty arose from the facts known to it. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents issues of great importance to the law of 
real estate in the State of Utah. Historically, the purpose of 
recording acts has been to create a system through which 
purchasers of real property can confidently determine title to 
realty. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff Dakal sought to purchase 
realty and, in so doing, relied on both the record of title 
showing that the interest of Defendant American had been released 
and the representations of Defendant American itself that any 
interest it may have held in the property had been discharged. 
Whatever duty Plaintiff may have had to inquire further, 
Plaintiff fulfilled that duty in a reasonable fashion. The 
standard should continue to be "reasonable inquiry", and asking 
the potential claimant should continue to meet that standard. 
Respectfully submitted this 2~^ day of May, 1988. 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
/ Jerome H. Mooney 
\ Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondent 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Utah Code Annotated, 17-21-11 
Every such certified copy from the time of filing the same 
w ^ n the recorder for record imparts notice to all persons of the 
contents thereof, and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien 
holders purchase and take with the same notice and effect as if 
~
!c h -• '-"^ -^ '.--./• - ,-;,,••,- r^^^^-rir>r> d^^d c" ?^*•' "" '' transf er 
Utah Code Annotated, 38-1-9 
36*1-9. Notice imparted by record, 
(] ) Th€ recorder must record the claim, in an i ndex 
in a i n t a i n e d f o r that purpose. 
(2) From, the time the claim, is filed for record# all 
persons are considered to have notice of the c1ai m. 
Utah Code Annotated, 57-1-6 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice _- Operation and 
e f £ ect - Interest of person not named in instrument 
Every conveyance of real estate, and rvery instrumen* 
writing setting forth, an agreement to convey any real estate <>-
whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as notice 
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certifier 
the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the /vri'ice of 
the recorder of the county in, which, such real estate is squared, 
but shall be valid, and binding between, the parties thereto 
without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification .-: record a::o 
as to all other persons who have had actual notice. Neither t;;e 
fact that an instrument, recorded, as herein provided, recites 
only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee 
such instrument is designated as trustee, or tnat tte conveyance 
otherwise purports to be in trust without nam:re the 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust, shai.. o^t.-ate t./-
charge any third person with notice of the interest of any person 
or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such, lesser 
interest as was conveyed to him,, by such, i nstrument free and clear 
of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument 
recorded as herein provided setting forth the names of 
beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the 
property charged with such interest. 
Utah Code Annotated, 57-3-3 
57-3-3, Effect of failure to record. 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall 
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as 
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, 
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
RULE 52. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 52. Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, 
issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on 
all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
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"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American 
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald 
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased 
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint 
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter 
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched 
at American's expense. 
II. FACTS 
The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen 
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and 
events dating back to 1978. The Court has carefully reviewed 
the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed 
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary 
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses. 
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts 
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of 
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration 
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore 
refer to such Stipulation when necessary. In the following 
Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where 
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Trans-
cript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court. 
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legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements 
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following 
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties: 
A. NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY 
The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified 
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus 
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the 
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice" 
of American's security interest in the property which was 
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the 
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified. It 
is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight 
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been 
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice. The 
Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of 
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to 
statehood. Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before 
the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs. 
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual 
notice" as follows: 
This statute was under examination by 
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah 
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held 
that the "actual notice" required by 
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party 
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In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated 
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case, 
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a 
bona fide purchaser of the property. The Court is in substantial 
agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages 
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984. 
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer 
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property 
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23). The Court also concludes 
that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the 
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal 
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal 
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs' Exs. 5 & 6; 
Defendants1 Exs. 4 2 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan 
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein). 
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified 
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual 
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, 
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are 
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust 
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American. 
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more 
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry 
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation 
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing 
its Trust Deed on the property. Such an inquiry would have 
in all probability led to the discovery that neither the 
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. Both Pentelute 
and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed 
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were 
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and 
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at 
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises 
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants' Exs. 35, 36, 
38, 40). 
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events 
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should 
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches' 
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property. 
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property 
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less 
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00 
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day 
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for 
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21; Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the above-
mentioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly 
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers 
of the property under Utah statutory and case law. 
B. THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity 
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean 
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment. 
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that 
the Rydalches do have "unclean hands" by reason of their representa-
tions of fee simple ownership of the property with no security 
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property 
without the written or oral approval of American. 
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises 
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject 
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's 
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly 
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed 
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement 
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale 
or transfer of the property (Defendants' Ex. 35). The Rydalches 
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart 
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of 
the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that 
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title 
Co. for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain 
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the 
property (Defendants' Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer 
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred 
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of 
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based 
upon an appraisal of the property by Academy Appraisal Associates 
(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance 
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed 
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40). 
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that 
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property 
was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have 
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable 
relief. It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with 
the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent 
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises. 
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable 
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their 
representations that American's interest in the property had 
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal. 
C. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT 
As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified 
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunction 
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra, 
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding 
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are 
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified 
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated. 
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to 
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid 
principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the 
same payment terms of principal and interest as American's original 
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the 
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American's 
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security interest shall be Dakal. Dakal shall have six months 
to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any 
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance 
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such 
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal. All rental payments 
from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal. 
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense 
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the 
property. The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches 
to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal. The $14,000.00 finders 
fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the 
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and 
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party 
to these proceedings. A Judgment by the Court is therefore 
rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00. 
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the 
property are terminated. 
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable 
of all the parties now before the Court. His only liability 
could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining 
the prior approval of American. Without ruling on the legal 
question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the 
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes 
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that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally 
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above. Therefore, 
all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property 
or American's claims against Liston are terminated. 
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most 
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated 
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino 
Corporation. However, none of these parties is now before the 
Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against 
any of them. 
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility 
for the events leading up to these proceedings. Although only 
mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the 
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the 
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its 
interest in the property. It is therefore the judgment of the 
Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which 
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court, 
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from 
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision, 
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and in accordance therewith. Such documents shall be submitted 
to the Court and other parties by June 20. 1984 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
E. PRATT 
& C A H O O N 
EYS AT LAW 
1CAN SAVINGS 
•LAZA 
ECOND SOUTH 
.AKE CITY. 
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DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC,, a Utah ) 
corporation, and DAKAL, INC.f a ) 
Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER ) 
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband) 
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY ) 
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and ) 
wife; each idividually; and ) 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee ) 
and not individually; and AMERICAN ) 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah ) 
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT) 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah bank- ) 
ing corporation; and M & W ENTER- ) 
PRISES, allegedly a Utah general ) 
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1) 
through 10 being all other persons ) 
unknown, claiming any right, title,) 
estate or interest in, or lien upon) 
the real property described in the ) 
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs1) 
ownership, or clouding their title ) 
thereto, ) 
Defendants, ) 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA- ) 
TION, ) 
Third-party ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C83-2042 
Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge 
DE. PRATT 
5 & C A H O O N 
INEYS AT LAW 
IRICAN SAVINGS 
PLAZA 
" SECOND SOUTH 
r LAKE CITY. 
V S . 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS ) 
F. RYDALCH, ) 
Third-party ) 
Defendants. ) 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
J, Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th 
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre-
viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties 
being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For 
the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar 
Liston, David J. Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams 
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas R. Rydalch, Duane A. 
3urnett, Esq. 
The parties represented at the hearing having entered into 
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the 
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defen-
dant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court 
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, 
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined 
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the prem-
ises, makes the following: 
-o-
FINDINGS OP FACT 
1. On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American") made a loan to Donald J, and Karen H. Bailey in the 
sum of $59,200, which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and 
a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978, 
and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No, 3059974 at page 826 
of Book 4619 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
2. The real property (hereinafter "property") described in 
said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the offi-
cial plat thereof, recorded in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
3. In October, 1980, the Baileys sold the property to 
Defendant Mark Engar Liston (sometimes hereinafter "Liston") who 
assumed the Baileys' loan with American upon American's approval 
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification 
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment. 
4. In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed 
the above-described loan, the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment was waived specifically and exclusively for the conveyance 
from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment did remain in effect as to subsequent sales. 
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5. On May 14, 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a War-
ranty Deed without the approval or knowledge of American, even 
though the property was still subject to American's Trust Deed. 
6. On May 28, 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-
val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F. 
Rydalch (sometimes hereinafter "Rydalch") and his wife, Joan 
Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch 
as "Rydalches). 
7. The Warranty Deed conveying the property from M & W 
Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property 
was subject to American's Trust Deed. 
8. The Buyer's Escrow Instructions, executed by the 
Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to 
American's Trust Deed and also subject to the Deed of Trust 
Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of Ameri-
can prior to any sale or transfer of the property. 
9. The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-
ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged 
that Stewart Title Company, the escrow and closing agent, had 
informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agree-
ment, and that the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify 
Stewart Title Company for any consequences resulting from the 
failure to obtain written approval from American prior to the 
transfer of the property. 
10. M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-
ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred to the 
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Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and 
insurance on the property. 
1 1 . Based upon an appraisal of the property by Academy 
Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches received a title insurance 
policy from Stewart Title Company in the amount of $103,000. 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself, 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of 
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement. 
12. The closing officer at Stewart Title Company further 
indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that 
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
13. American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust 
Deed on the property by reconveyance which was recorded on 
December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in 
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
14. The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been 
paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given. Said Trust Deed 
continues to be unpaid. 
15. On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit as 
Entry No. 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that 
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mis-
take. 
16. Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's 
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17. On January 21, 1983, for the sum of $37,980, the 
Rydalches sold the subject property to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Dakal") which on the same day, sold the property to 
Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (hereinafter "Diversified") 
or "Diversified Equities") for tne sum of 560,000. 
18. Prior to the sale of the property to Dakal, Defendant 
Rydalch represented to Dakal that American's interest in the pro-
perty had been satisfied. 
19. At the time of the sale of the property from the 
Rydalches to Dakal, Wayne Peck was the President and principal 
executive officer of Dakal and Diversified. 
20. An individual by the name of Brad Pentelute arranqed the 
sale of the property (from the Rydalches to Dakal) in behalf of 
Dakal and Wayne Peck. 
21. Pentelute and/or Peck had more than sufficient informa-
tion to necessitate a further inquiry into whether Rydalch had 
actaally satisfied the obligation to American and whether American 
had made a mistake in releasing its Trjst Deed on zne property. 
22. Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to 
the discovery tnat neither tne Rydalches nor anyone else had paid 
American and that American's release of its Trust Deed was, m 
fact, a mistake. 
23. Botn Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had substantial 
experience and dealings witn distressed properties and real estate 
transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market 
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value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's inter-
est in the property at the time the Rydalches acquired the pro-
perty from M & W Enterprises. 
24. The property was sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for 
approximately one-half or less of its market value. 
25. Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of S14,000 to 
3rad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-
cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether 
Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation to American and 
whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on 
the property. 
2. Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to 
the discovery that neither the Rydalchs or anyone else had paid 
American and that American's release of its Trust Deed was in fact 
a mistake. 
3. In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or 
should have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalch's 
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property. 
Supporting facts which include the "distress" sale of the property 
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less of 
its market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad Pentelute 
by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of $37,980, 
and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversi-
fied by Wayne Peck for 560,000. 
4. Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had "actual notice" of 
American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly 
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from 
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified. 
5. Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of 
Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property 
from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
6. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver-
sified Equities. 
7. The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck 
are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified Equities in regard to 
American's Trust Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by Ameri-
can. 
8. Therefore, Dakal and Diversified Equities had "actual 
notice" of American's security interest in the property which was 
mitakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the pro-
perty from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified Equi-
ties. 
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9. Neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, Inc., 
nor Dakal, Inc., was a bona fide purchaser of the property. 
10. Thus, neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, 
Inc., nor Dakal, Inc. should be entitled to prevail over Ameri-
can's claims against the property. 
11. The Rydalchs either knew or certainly should have known 
that their obligation to American had not been paid, since they 
had not done so and that American's release of its trust deed on 
the property had to be a mistake. 
12. The Rydalchs have "unclean hands" by reason of their 
representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no 
security interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the 
property without the written or oral approval of American. 
13. Because one who comes before a court of equity with 
"unclean hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treat-
ment, the Rydalchs are not entitled to favorable, equitable 
relief. 
14. All transactions regarding the transfer of the property 
from Dakal to Diversified should be rescinded and all rights 
and/or liabilities of Diversified Equities to the property or 
Dakal, respectively, should be terminated. 
15. Pursuant to its original trust deed dated SQ/fi/ori SLI. /9'7f 
and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 
in Book 4619 of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder in Salt Lake County, Utah, American is entitled to an 
equitable lien upon the property for the amount of unpaid princi-
pal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the same pay-
ment terms as American's original trust deed [as set forth in this 
paragraph) and all other terms of said trust deed with the speci-
fic exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American's 
security interest should be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc. 
16. Title to the property should be quieted in Dakal, sub-
ject to an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of 
unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely 
the same payment terms of principal and interest as American's 
original trust deed (dated January 27, 1978 and recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 2, 1978, as 
Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619) and all other terms of 
said trust deed, with the specific exception that the sole obligor 
or trustor of American's security interest should be Dakal. 
17. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
balance owed to American under its equitable lien is the sum of 
$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said equitable lien (which 
total 315,886.00) consist of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, 
interest in the sum of S12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum 
of $1,956.28. 
18. Dakal should have six months from May 30, 1984, to bring 
current all arrearages for monthly payments and any arrearages for 
the reserve account (which is used to pay taxes and insurance on 
the property). 
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19. All principal interest and reserve account payments to 
American under its equitable lien should be the sole obligation of 
Dakal. 
20. All rental payments from tenants of the property paid in 
escrow or currently due should go to Dakal. 
21. The Rydalchs have been unjustly enriched at the expense 
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980, the sale price of the pro-
perty. 
22. The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalchs to 
Dakal should remain as paid by Dakal. 
23. The $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Dakal 
or Wayne Peck was not part of the sale price of the property. 
24. Judgment should be rendered against the Third-party 
Defendant Rydalch and in favor of Dakal for $37,980. 
25. All rights and/or liabilities of Third-party Defendant 
Rydalch relating to the property should be terminated. 
26. Defendant Liston is the least culpable of all the par-
ties now before the Court. 
27. Without ruling on the legal question of whether Liston 
may still be liable pursuant to the terms of American's Non-
Assumption Agreement, it would be inequitable for Defendant Liston 
to remain personally liable to American. 
27. All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Liston relat-
ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be 
terminated. 
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28. All rights and/or liabilites of Defendant Liston relat-
ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be 
terminated. 
29. Because of the parties now before the Court bear some 
responsbilities for the events leading up to these proceedings and 
because the result of the entire chain of events would not have 
occurred except for the negligent and unilateral mistake of Ameri-
can in releasing its interest in the property, each party should 
bear its own costs and attorneys fees. Also American is not enti-
tled to any late fees which have accrued as of May 30/ 1984. 
DATED this day of June, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 20, 1984, I personally hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the offices of the following 
counsel: 
Jerome H. Mooney, Esq. 
Arthur H. Strong, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
356 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Spencer E. Austin, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake Qltv, UT 84147 3. 
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I hereby certify that on June 20, 1984, I personally hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the offices of the following 
counsel: 
David J. Knowlton, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
2910 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84402 
Duane A. Burnett, Esq. 
710 West 2125 South 
Woods Cross, Utah 84087 
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Cite as 739 ?2d 1133 (LtahApp 1987) 
ication Rule 19(a) instructs the trial 
ourt to join as a partv a person whose 
absence will prevent complete relief among 
hose already parties. A plain reading of 
iules 17(a) and 19(a) reveals that the trial 
;ourt should make every effort to insure 
Jiat the proceeding adjudicates the rights 
)f those necessary and intended to be be-
fore the court. In conjunction with this 
basic concept is the requirement in Utah 
R.CivP 15(a) which state* that lea\e shall 
be freely given to amend a pleading when 
justice so requires This admonition is giv-
en m the sentence which declares tnat sub-
sequent amendments to pleadings may be 
made only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse part> 
[2] Defendant cannot claim that «t was 
not aware of plaintiffs status as a partner-
ship as early as nine months prior to the 
trial During the ta« r£ of depositions m 
August of 1983 defendant's cuursel was 
informed that plaintiff was a par^r-rsHip 
Plaintiffs status was also revealed to de-
fendant both by the Stipulation ana Order 
to Amend mailed to counsel and at the 
pre-trial settlement conference l 
The issue of dismissing an action with 
prejudice was recently addressed b> the 
Utah Supreme Court in Bonneville Toner 
v. Thompson Mirme Assoc, 723 P2a 1017 
(Utah 1986) The trial court's dismissal for 
failure to join indispensable parties was 
affirmed but the Supic *e Court remanded 
with the instruction to enter the dismissal 
without prejudice That Court wrote 
While the court below properly exercised 
its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs ac-
tion for failing to cumply with Ru e 19(a), 
it was improper to do so with prejudice 
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 
41(b) is a harbh and nprmappnt remedy 
when it precludes a presentation of a 
plaintiffs claims jn the'r ^PHTS Our 
rules of procedure are intended to en-
courage the adjudication of di lutes on 
their merits. 
for the court to dismiss with prejudice 
and prevent future consideration of the 
claims should the defect be corrected. 
The trial court aoused its discretion by 
entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Id at 1020 
[3] In this case we believe the court 
abused its discretion in not allowing the 
amendment or granting a continuance. 
Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could 
it, but instead relied on the specter of in-
creased costs and complexity if the amend-
ment was granted Despite the parties be-
ing represented by the same counsel 
throughout the proceedings and despite 
th^re being no surprise, the dismissal with 
prejudice was granted While courts are 
given great latitude and discretion in the 
application of the law, they still must have 
»uff cient grounds to apply the "harsh and 
permanent remedy" of a dismissal with 
prejudice No such grounds appear here 
The dismissal *ith prejudice and the 
judgment are reversal and the case is re-
manded for trial 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, J J , 
concur 
V 
DIVERSIFIED EQLITIES, INC., 
corporation, and Daka!, Inc, 
a Utah 
a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
AMERICAN SWINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendant 
and Responded. 
No. 860287-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
July 22, 1987 
Not having considered the merits of Action was brought to quiet title to 
plaintiffs claims, there was no reason property The District Court, Salt Lake 
*• At trial, counsel for defendant admitted re 
ceiving the request to stipulate to the tiling of 
the Second Amended Complaint but stated that 
he uas unwilling to so stipulate 
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County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., quieted 
title in subsequent purchasers subject to 
equitable lien in favor of holder of trust 
deed. Appeal was taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that unrecorded 
conveyance was void as against subsequent 
purchasers. 
Reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser <s=229(2) 
For unrecorded conveyance to be void 
as against any subsequent purchaser in 
good faith and for valuable consideration, 
subsequent purchaser must show he had no 
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge of 
prior conveyance or that prior conveyance 
did not impart constructive notice or that 
prior conveyance was not recorded before 
his conveyance in same land was recorded. 
U.C.A.1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser s=>229(2> 
If a subsequent purchaser has infor-
mation or facts which would put prudent 
person upon inquiry which, if pursued, 
would lead to actual knowledge as to state 
of title, unrecorded conveyance is not void 
as against subsequent purchaser. U.C.A. 
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser s=>229(2) 
Unrecorded conveyance was void as 
against subsequent purchasers, although 
mortgage broker and principal of subse-
quent purchasers had sufficient informa-
tion to necessitate further inquiry on status 
of trust deed; broker and principal acted 
with sufficient diligence to meet duty im-
posed by doctrine of inquiry notice by hav-
ing title search performed and personally 
contacting trust deed holder which mistak-
enly stated that loan was paid off. U.C.A. 
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong, 
Mooney & Smith, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams III, 
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and respondent. 
Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellants Diversified Equities, Inc. (Di-
versified) and Dakal, Inc. (Dakal) brought 
an action to quiet title to a duplex and lot 
in Salt Lake County. Respondent Ameri-
can Savings and Loan (American) had a 
recorded security interest in the property 
which was released prior to the conveyanc-
es to Diversified and Dakal. The lower 
court quieted title in Dakal, subject to an 
equitable lien in favor of American equal to 
the principal amount owing on the note 
secured by American's previous trust deed. 
Dakal seeks reversal of the lower court's 
judgment and an order that Dakal owns 
the property in fee simple, free of any 
interest in American. Diversified, which 
bought the property from Dakal, seeks re-
versal of the judgment below and an order 
upholding its rights against Dakal in the 
property. We reverse. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
So far as is relevant for this appeal, 
which concerns only the rights of Dak-
al/Diversified and American inter se, the 
dispute was submitted to the lower court 
on a detailed stipulation of facts read into 
the record by counsel. Although there are 
several transactions, the key facts are rela-
tively simple. 
On January 2, 1978, American loaned the 
Baileys $59,200, which was secured by a 
trust deed to the property in question. The 
trust deed was recorded in February 1973. 
The property was then sold in 1980 to 
Liston, then on May 14, 1982 by Liston to 
M & W Enterprises. Although M & W d;d 
not pay cash, Liston parted with title to the 
property. M & W's future obligations 
were not secured by the subject propery 
but instead Liston was given a trust deed 
in other property, which proved to :* 
worthless as security. M & Wr sold the 
subject property to Rydalch on May >• 
1982, as the first part of a contemplate 
exchange transaction. The property *"*** 
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still subject to American'* original trust 
deed, and the deed to Rydalch so recited, as 
did various closing papers. 
In order to purchase the property from 
M & W, Rydalch borrowed $18,000 from 
Holzer, who took in return a note for $19,-
200. M & W's principal, Miller, promised 
to repay Holzer within 30 days. Instead, 
Miller skipped town. Rydalch then at-
tempted to sell the property to raise the 
money to repay the note to Holzer and had 
his attorney, Burnett, investigate the liens 
on the property. Burnett learned from an-
other financial institution that its trust 
deed of record had actually been dis-
charged and he secured a reconveyance. 
Rydalch and Burnett then called American 
a total of three times and, while the first 
call was inconclusive, were told each of the 
other times that the loan to the Baileys had 
been repaid. Rydalch apparently chose not 
to be too curious about who his benefactor 
might be. 
Prompted by the telephone calls, Ameri-
can executed and recorded a reconveyance 
in early December 1982. American subse-
quently discovered that the loan had not 
been paid and that there was a balance due 
in excess of $55,000. Apparently American 
erred because the Baileys had some thirty-
four loans with American, and American's 
records were somewhat confused. The tri-
al court concluded that American was neg-
ligent in reconveying the property.1 
Meanwhile, Holzer began threatening 
Rydalch that he dnd his family would sus-
tain bodily harm if the amount due him was 
not paid. Although Holzer had received a 
trust deed to the duplex property, he want-
ed cash. Rydalch then responded to an ad 
placed by Pentelute, a self described mort-
gage broker specializing m distressed 
^ales. Pentelute spoke to Rydalch, Ry-
dalch's attorney Burnett, and American, 
and received confirmation all around that 
*• The reconveyance gives everv appearance of 
Scing the product of a deliberate—and delibera-
tive—act. The "Full Reconvevance" was signed 
by one officer and attested bv another. It recit-
ed that written instructions to reconvey had 
been received from the beneficiary and that the 
note secured by the trust deed had been present-
ed for endorsement. It additional^ recited that 
American's trust deed had been satisfied. 
Pentelute was furnished a copy of the re-
conveyance. Pentelute then contacted 
Wayne Peck, a principal in both Dakal and 
Diversified, who agreed to purchase the 
property. Pentelute ordered a title search, 
which disclosed nothing unexpected except 
a lis pendens recorded in September 1982 
on behalf of Liston. To facilitate the sale 
which would raise his repayment, on Janu-
ary 21. 1983, Holzer obtained a release of 
the lis pendens, albeit with a bad check, 
and the sale from Rydalch to Dakal was 
closed later that day. 
Dakal paid 338,260 for the property and 
paid Pentelute a $14,000 finder's fee. Dak-
al immediately recorded its warranty deed 
and sold the property to Diversified for 
$60,000. A month later American, having 
discovered its mistake, recorded an affida-
vit stating that it had released the trust 
deed in error and that the trust deed was 
still in effect. 
On these facts,2 the trial court held that 
Diversified and Dakal were not bona fide 
purchasers of the property. It concluded 
that Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had 
more than sufficient information to necessi-
tate yet further inquiry into whether Ry-
dalch or any one else had actually satisfied 
the obligation to American and whether 
American had made a mistake in releasing 
its trust deed on the property. The trial 
court cited the following facts as imposing 
upon Pentelute and Peck a duty of further 
inquiry: the reference to American's lien in 
Rydalch's deed, the sale of the property by 
Rydalch to Dakal for approximately one-
half or less of its market value; the $14,-
000 finder's fee paid to Pentelute compared 
to the purchase price of some $38,000; and 
the same-day transfer of the property from 
Dakal to Diversified. The trial court qui-
eted title in Dakal, subject to an equitable 
lien in favor of American. 
the reconveyance vvas executed by authority of a 
resolution of American's board of directors. 
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include noth-
ing inconsistent with the conclusion that the 
dealings of Rvdalch and Dakal, through the bro-
ker Pentelute, were at arm's length. 
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The issue on appeal is whether there was 
sufficient notice of a "lien" on the property 
to require a duty of further inquiry by 
Dakal. If there was, Dakal was not a bona 
fide purchaser and took the property sub-
ject to American's "lien." 3 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
[1] Under our recording statute, an 
unrecorded conveyance is "void as against 
any subsequent purchaser in good faith 
and for valuable consideration of the same 
real estate . . . where his own conveyance 
shall be first duly recorded." Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-3 (1986). However, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), unrecord-
ed documents affecting real property are 
enforceable as against persons with "actual 
notice." Thus, "[a] subsequent purchaser 
must . . . show that he had no actual nuti-je, 
i.e , no personal knowledge, of a prior con-
veyance or that the prior conveyance did 
not impart constructive notice, i.e., was not 
recorded before his conveyance in the same 
land was recorded." Utah Farm Prod. 
Credit Ass'n. v. Wasatch Bank 734 P.2d 
904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1987). Wayne Peck and 
Pentelute obviously did not have construc-
tive or record notice because American had 
mistakenly released its trust deed and re-
corded its reconveyance before they dealt 
with the property. 
[2] As for the "actual notice" exception 
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), the 
stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pente-
lute did not have actual knowledge of 
American's interest. However, the excep-
tion is ako triggered if a party dealing with 
the land has information or facts which 
would put a prudent person upon an in-
quiry which, if pursued, would lead to actu-
al knowledge as to the state of the title. 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P 2d 308, 310 (Utah 
3. For purposes of this appeal, we employ the 
parties' logic that the 'egai effect of an lmprovi-
dently recorded recon\e>ance is to leave the 
lien created by the trust deed in legal existence, 
albeit unrecorded. We are not asked to decide 
whether reconveyance has the legal effect of 
actually terminating the lien created by a trust 
deed and rendering the accompanying note, if it 
has not been repaid, unsecured. 
1983). Whether a party should be charged 
with "actual notice," either in the sense of 
having actual knowledge or being on in-
quiry notice, turns on questions of fact. 
See id. The trial court "found" that Peck 
and Pentelute were chargeable with "actu-
al notice." 
EFFECT OF STIPULATED FACTS 
Generally, a trial court's findings of fact 
are accorded great deference. However, 
without regard to the labels used, when 
those "findings" proceed from stipulated 
facts, as in the instant case, the "findings" 
are tantamount to conclusions of law, with 
the stipulation of facts being the functional 
equivalent of true findings of fact. See 
Stiles i\ Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala. 
1080V See also City of Spencer v Hawk-
eye Security his. Co., 216 N.W 2d 406, 408 
(Iowa 1974) ("Where the facts are not in 
matenal dispute, interpretation placed 
thereon by trial court becomes a question 
of law which is not conclusive on appeal."); 
Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 
(Mo. 1979) (only issue on appeal was wheth-
er trial court drew the proper legal conclu-
sions from the stipulated facts). On ap-
peal, this court reviews conclusions of law 
for legal correctness. Copper State Thrift 
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
App.1987). See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
[3] After a careful review of the stipu-
lated facts, we cannot agree with the Iov%er 
court's conclusion of law that Pentelute 
and Peck (as opposed to Rydalch. who 
clearly knew better) had sufficient informa 
tion to necessitate further inquiry into the 
status of American's trust deed.4 
4. The previously identified specific factors re 
lied on by the court in support of its conclusion 
that Pentelute and Peck were not bona fide 
purchasers do not tilt toward that result. Refer-
ence in Rydalch's deed to American's interest 
was meaningless in the face of American's sua-
sequent reconveyance. A distress sale well De-
low market price can be prompted by numerous 
factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stipulation 
of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed^ 
sell >o cheaply because he could not secure -
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While the circumstances were suspicious 
and called for inquiry, Pentelute, acting for 
Peck, inquired—and with sufficient dil-
igence to meet the duty imposed by the 
doctrine of inquiry notice. He had a title 
search performed and he personally con-
tacted American even though the results of 
Rydalch's and Burnett's three prior con-
tacts were accurately—if disingenuously— 
communicated to him and even though he 
had a copy of the reconveyance. American 
confirmed what the title search, the recon-
veyance, Burnett, and Rydalch all told him. 
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakal and Diversi-
fied, reasonably relied on the title search 
and the clear evidence, both documentary 
and verbal, of Americans reconveyance.5 
American negligently released its trust 
deed, and its security interest will not be 
preserved against bona fide third party 
purchasers who, at least on the facts as 
loan since the duplex was not owner occurred 
and because of fbe 'is pendens against the prop-
erty. In addition, it was actually stipulated that 
Rydalch was jnder extreme pressure because of 
Holzer's threats of violence and because uf 'he 
imminenc> of a trustee s sale noticed by Hoizer. 
A hefty finders fee is to be expected w^ere a 
free-lance brcker finds a property which can be 
had for a comparative ^org A same-dav trans-
fer from one re?a"*d ~"nr> ro •"*ether m.gnt be 
effected for a lu^be* - of *ax or business rea-
sons. In this case, Diversified was a group of 
investors put together hv Peck but who, -nuke 
Peck, apparently nad no interest in Dakal The 
back-to back sales left the Diversified sharehold-
ers with a property worm more than thev rad to 
pay for it, while netting Da*?', in which Peek 
apparently had a greater interest, SS 000 00 
profit. 
5. A duty of inquiry requires the partv to make 
inquiry and *o di1 gently do 'hat wh*ch the an-
stipulated, were bona fide purchasers with-
out notice and without further duty to in-
quire. To hold otherwise would defeat the 
purpose of the recording statutes and sub-
vert the sound commercial policy they pro-
mote. 
We reverse and remand with instructions 
to quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified, 
as their interests may appear, as against 
American. Each party shall bear its own 
costs of appeal. 
JACKSON and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
swer to the inquiry reasonably prompts Pente-
Lte s mquirv elicited an answer which was con-
sistent with the reconvevance document he had 
seen, the title report, and Rydalch's and Bur-
netts reports about what they were told. It 
would stretch the notion of inquiry notice be-
yond the breaking print TO hold that the answer 
Pentelute received to his Tquiry of American 
should have prompted him to go further What 
would he have done^ Demand to see rece.pts, 
instructions for reconveyance from the benefi-
ciarv to the trustee or the chairman of Ameri-
can s board^ He obviously had borne concern 
or with a reconveyance regular on its face in 
hand, there would be no reason to call Ameri-
can for verbal confirmation of the fact of recon-
vevance But a duty to inquire is not a duty to 
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set 
straight See also Note 1, supra. 
